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CHATHAM'S COLONIAL POLICY

THE long and desperate struggle of England with France in the middle of the eighteenth century for the headship of the New World may be regarded as the war of one man against a nation. It was the war of Chatham against the old giant of ambition, the "glorious way of thinking" which the whole house of Bourbon had received as a family legacy from their common ancestor, the Great Monarch of France.

For England, before Chatham's colonial policy was framed, the colonial war was chiefly a mercantile question. That the French had passed the Rhine and threatened Hanover, was nothing to the nation of merchants whose interests were not directly affected. But the encroachments of the French on the hinterland of the American colonies, the depletion of the Newfoundland banks by the cod fishers of New France, and the competition of the French West Indian sugar plantations, kindled a flame which leapt across the continent and caught the islands of the Caribbean Sea. Therefore the voice of the "mercantile part of the nation" was still for war, and the victorious war minister became their idol: for a successful war meant the monopoly of a profitable trade, not only with the American plantations and the Atlantic Islands, but also with Indian nabobs, Arabian sultans and Ashantee kings. No man should rob them of their colonists. These were their very children whom they had bound apprentices to the colonial trade and who had thriven by their industry until they were in a position to start business on their own account for the clear benefit of British trade.

It has become of late the fashion to extenuate this quaint political morality, and to deprecate the "falsification of history" which estimates the political wisdom of the statesmen and parliaments of the reign of George the Third by the contrast of our modern enlightenment.

It is true that allowance must be made in all ages for the force of contemporary sentiment; but at the same time it may at least be of interest to ascertain the true meaning of the colonial policy of the one British minister who, before the loss of the American colonies, can be said to have had a colonial policy at all.

It is usual to insist that the later alienation of the American colonies from the mother kingdom was directly due to the taxation for which Chatham's successful war policy furnished a plausible excuse.

That Chatham himself did not approve of the financial policy of his successors, or at least of the constitutional doctrine by which it was held to be justified, is a matter of common knowledge. At the same time it may be that taxation was not the only cause of civil strife, and in any case Chatham's sentiments towards the colonies during his famous ministry have never been clearly explained. Still less has any serious attempt been made to conjecture the attitude which he must have adopted in view of the inevitable results of his own war policy.

The reason of this lack of knowledge is unfortunately only too clear. While the political memoirs and official despatches which commemorate the most notable events of the period have been freely used for the purpose of the historian's narrative, the official correspondence of the several departments of the state in which the details of the statesman's policy can alone be traced, and the great mass of family papers which contain many a clue for the elucidation of that policy, have never been examined for the present purpose.¹

It may be possible then from these neglected materials to throw some further light on the interesting problem which has been referred to. But it will be necessary in the first place to define briefly the position of the colonial question at the date of Pitt's assumption of office from the respective points of view of the government and the governed with regard to the three main issues of the French war, extraordinary taxation and illicit trade. It will then, perhaps, be of interest to examine Pitt's policy herein as far as his ministry extends and to consider the logical consequences of that policy which was brought to such an untimely conclusion.

The opinion common amongst English historical students that the history of this period has been invariably treated by American writers in a partial and exaggerated spirit is curiously wide of the truth. The truth indeed is that the ablest, at least, of these writers have been careful to consult the original sources of history which had remained for a hundred years neglected in this country.² On the authority of these contemporary evidences they have compiled a real historical narrative of the causes and effects of this momentous struggle.³ So far from exonerating the colonists from all responsibility for the grievous mistakes committed therein and for the heavy sacrifices which they entailed, we find these patriotic writers

¹ For the key to the classification of these sources, see *Quarterly Review*, October, 1899, Art. 3. For the value of the departmental records referred to, see the present writer's article on "Poor General Wolfe" in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, July, 1884.

² *I. e.*, England. The writer, Hubert Hall, Esq., F.S.A., Director of the Royal Historical Society, is an official of the Public Record Office in London.—ED.

³ The historical sources referred to have been summarized by Parkman and by Winsor.

admitting the justice of the strictures of colonial governors and commanders and the admissions of clear-sighted observers of the course of events. The colonist of those days, they tell us frankly, was "simply a 'provincial' —and a narrow one." They can quote sympathetically the outburst of a much-tried governor, "Such wrong-headed people, I thank God, I never had to do with before," and they virtually admit that there is some truth in the proposition that "a governor is really to be pitied in the discharge of his duty to his King and Country in having to do with such obstinate and self-conceited people." We read throughout of "clashing interests," of "internal disputes" in the face of an outward enemy and of the "misplaced economy of pennywise and short-sighted assembly-men" wherein "lay the hope of France."

For in the common view of English ministers and colonial governors, of British parliaments and colonial assemblies, France was the deadly enemy of the lives and liberties of the American provincials. And France was gathering her famous regiments upon their borders. Nay, but for the blockade of the French ports and the fatal drain of the campaign in Germany, France could have placed ten men in the field for every British regular or provincial. As it was the odds were exactly reversed in respect of numbers, but not, it was said, of fighting power; for "numbers avail nothing without counsel and valor."¹ This was not unnaturally the view of the professional soldiers who secretly despised the peaceful disposition of the colonists. The English settlers, they bitterly complained, were "of a commercial, the French of a military disposition: the latter enterprising, restless, subtle, active and ambitious; the first sedentary, softened, fond of quiet and lucre."²

It was a great mistake, these wise-acres assured the government, to suppose that the "American English are fitted for military purposes without the exercise of some painful campaign." Their only chance lay in the superiority of numbers, and this was deliberately sacrificed by the parsimony of the colonial governments. "We have it in our power," an official writer declared, "to be ten times as strong as the French and much better provided: but if ten men are in war with a thousand and the latter detach only an equal number to the engagement, what benefit do they receive for their superiority of numbers?"³

It is no wonder then that men saw the "English everywhere invaded, defenceless and impotent." An intelligent colonial writes in the year 1756 to an English correspondent in the same pessimistic strain:

¹ Pringle MSS.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

"The people in England are not aware of the difficulties we meet with in carrying on the war here. Our enemies, rich and poor, are obliged to act against us. With us our Colonies from envy and particular interests draw against one another. In short, such is our situation, peace would seem necessary for the present in order to prepare ourselves for war."¹

And yet, it would have been replied, that for several years past, and in a definite form since 1754, the English government through its colonial officers had incessantly urged upon the several assemblies the absolute necessity for such preparations. But this was all to no purpose. The assemblies "think they have served their country if they allow £10,000 or £15,000 for the current service of the year, and as few troops as possible," instead of raising a sufficient force, once for all, by means of a liberal grant. Thus in the disastrous campaign of 1756 it was estimated that the New England colonies, with a population of nearly half a million, could only provide General Johnson with 3,000 men for the attack on Crown Point; whilst Braddock, who should have been supported by the men of Pennsylvania, Maryland and the two Carolinas, colonies reputed to possess an equal population, had not in fact more than 800 provincials in his doomed army.²

It is true that exception might be taken to these semi-official statistics; but the point which we have to consider is this, that these versions of the campaign were communicated to ministers at home and received general credit in England. Moreover in substance they were correct. The real indifference of the colonial burgesses to the pressing requirements of the war can scarcely be denied and must be explained on wholly different grounds. On every side we read of bitter disputes between the colonial legislatures and the executive bodies. "The governor has embroil'd himself with the house of Representatives," writes quaint and honest Jeremiah Gridley from Boston in January of 1758, and has prorogued them "with a severe message, which they *had not time to answer*." And he adds that "the aspect of things is frowning."³

A month later the Earl of Loudoun unbosoms himself to the Duke of Newcastle in a dispatch such as Strafford might have endited to Laud. The colonists he considers are too many for their governors, at least in New England. A governor comes over sea bringing with him exalted notions of his dignity as the representative of the Crown. He tries to "ride the high horse," but pride comes before a fall. The assembly "waits for him" and trips him up, and from that day he is unable to carry a single point. There should be no mistake about it. The British regulars were an

² Pringle MSS.

¹ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

alien garrison. The Bostonians were preparing to resist the quartering of troops, and all the other governments of North America were only waiting "to see the success Boston had in their dispute to have turned the troops out of doors everywhere."¹

When things have come to this pass a colonial revolution is within measurable distance. But it might be asked who was really responsible for this state of things? Let us hear the other side.

The American colonists in the middle of the eighteenth century may have been "sedentary" and "softened," and were not improbably also "fond of quiet and lucre," but they shared these attributes with the Londoners whose ancestors had bearded and baffled tyrants from King Stephen's days onwards, and with the Dutch burghers who in a just cause had held the soldiery of Spain and France at bay behind their dykes.

The real answer to the sneers of their military critics is to be found not only in the complete failure of the latter to inspire confidence in their own plan of campaign, but also in the courage, the pertinacity and the final success of the citizen militia during their war of Independence.²

But as yet the position of the colonists was merely one of passive resistance to the futile proposals of an incompetent government. This attitude is well expressed in a memorial of the Assembly of Connecticut in the year 1758 setting forth all the sacrifices made by that colony, in common with the other New England colonies, since the beginning of the war.³

In the first place, when they were required to raise a thousand provincial troops for the expedition against Crown Point in 1755 they not only cheerfully complied, but, fearing this number would not suffice for such a service, they voluntarily added five hundred more as a reserve. They also enabled New York to furnish its quota by raising men in their colony in return for a very inadequate subsidy. Finally they not only produced the reserve above mentioned, but in the crisis of this disastrous campaign they voted an aid of fifteen hundred more. And so from year to year they have thrown precious lives (and more precious money) into the bottomless abyss of these frontier wars, and so they are ready to do again, "but, alas, it is to be feared to little purpose more than the loss of many lives and to the great expense of the government."

¹ *Ibid.*

² Some curious newsletters referring to Braddock's defeat have just been published by Mr. Darnell Davis, *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, October, 1899. The allusions in these to the superiority of the colonial militia against an ambushed enemy are particularly interesting at the present moment.

³ Pringle MSS. The same version is given in the Colonial Entry Books.

As to the responsibility of Newcastle, as the nominal head of a reactionary government, it is unnecessary to speak. The policy of a statesman who was Secretary of State for nearly thirty years without being aware that Cape Breton was an island may be left out of the question. The two ministers who were practically responsible for the disasters which brought Pitt into office were Halifax, as President of the Board of Trade and Plantations, and Sir Thomas Robinson as the departmental Secretary of State. If we add to these military and naval advisers as pedantic as Ligonier and Anson, commanders such as Braddock and Loudoun, governors of the type of Shirley, and the whole crew of brigadiers and post-captains, attorneys-general, vice-admirals and revenue officers, all prepared to take their cue from the sententious loyalty which pervaded the optimist despatches from Whitehall, we shall not be surprised if "the just grievances of his Majesty's loyal and faithful subjects" waited in vain for redress.

It is worthy of notice that Sir Thomas Robinson was the author of the precious policy which had brought about a crisis in America such as that which in England preceded the Petition of Right in the reign of Charles I. His scheme for a defensive union of at least the northern colonies in the year 1754, a "Plan or Project of general concert . . . for their mutual and common defence," though acceptable neither to loyalists nor to patriots, was certainly a plausible device; but it was also a plan which failed. And how could such a union be effective when its possible results were viewed with a jealous apprehension and when the whole conduct of the campaign and the patronage and credit of military service were assumed by the King's officers? The provincials were not required to save themselves so much as to save the regulars; food for powder like the helots whose bodies paved the way for the decisive charge of the janissaries. For with the Secretary of State's "Plan of Defense" were issued certain orders to colonial governors which may be regarded as the first cause of the estrangement which ripened into separation.

"You should use your utmost diligence and authority in procuring an exact observance of such orders as shall be issued from time to time by the Commander-in-Chief for quartering the troops, impressing carriages and provisions and necessities for such troops as shall arrive or be raised within your government—which orders have been continued down to this day. (1758.)"¹

But it was not only that the colonists as a body distrusted the policy and the very capacity of their rulers at a great crisis of their

¹Loudoun to Newcastle, February 19, 1758, in Pringle MSS. and Colonial Office Records.

fate, and that they resented the ostentatious employment of regular troops ; they were practically left to pay the bill, or at least more than their fair share.

In the year 1756 we find the Board of Trade attempting to estimate the total cost of the three great expeditions of the previous year. Admitting to the fullest extent the principle that the cost of the war must be chiefly borne by the mother country, the Board wished to make the most liberal allowance within their power. This they naïvely admit is also a matter of policy, to "encourage and reward" the colonies for the efforts which they have made in the past and which they will more than ever be required to make in the future. In order to obtain information on this subject they had examined the colonial agents, but unfortunately the latter were unable to furnish precise figures, and therefore it was only possible to make a calculation based on the apparent and probable expenditures entailed by the votes of the assemblies.

The estimate made by the Board for the total expenditure incurred by the several colonies involved in the war amounted to the sum of £170,000, and of this sum they recommended that the British government should repay £120,000. It was added, as a sort of rider, that this estimate was probably too high for some colonies, though possibly somewhat too low for others, and that it did not include the cost of transport, commissariat and incidental expenses, which had not been ascertained.¹

The recommendation of the Board was submitted to Parliament and the proposed grant was reduced to £115,000. It would be difficult now, though by no means so difficult at the time, to ascertain the approximate cost of the entire war to the colonies. The figures contained in a later estimate for Massachusetts alone are startling ;² but if this should seem an exceptional case, it may be noted that the comparatively poor colony of Connecticut found itself after three unsuccessful campaigns in debt for the sum of £70,000 or £80,000 "above all that could possibly be received for the service of those years."

The estimate of the Board of Trade, although it was more liberal than any subsequent grant, might, therefore, reasonably have been doubled, without taking into account the compensation due to individuals for purveyance or transport, as to which it should be remembered that claims for similar compensation were preferred by England's German allies during the Continental campaign, and were reluctantly admitted by the British treasury.³

¹ Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade Journals.

² Pringle MSS.

³ Treasury and Audit Office Records—"German Demands."

In justice to the colonies, however, it should be stated that this aspect of their financial difficulties was not presented by them as a grievance. The burden of taxation and debt incurred by them was meekly, if not very cheerfully endured, and even the moral liability of the mother country for this outlay was not directly asserted. Their case, indeed, resembled that of children who have been required to contribute out of their own pockets to some work of piety. They submitted yet they secretly repined. But when they found that something more than this was expected of them, that they were not only bound to pour out their blood and treasure in the quarrel of King George of England with King Louis of France, but also were required to desist absolutely from all commercial dealings with their best customers, their good friends the enemy, the sacrifice seemed too great even for their simple loyalty. How were they to carry on a war without the funds which the French themselves so thoughtfully supplied? Even the stern rule of Moses had not prevented the children of Israel from spoiling the Egyptians.

But the policy of the British government was inexorable. The French were to be starved out of America, and not only out of America but out of the West Indies. This, the second cause of the great rebellion, was the policy of Halifax at the Board of Trade. Only a week after the declaration of war with France the Board submitted to the Council additional instructions to be sent to all the American governors

“to take especial care and use their utmost endeavours to hinder all correspondence between your Majesty’s subjects in America and the subjects of the French King, and to prevent any of the Colonies and Plantations belonging to the enemy in America being supplied with provisions or warlike stores of any kind.”¹

These practices, it is stated in the preamble, have hitherto “greatly prejudiced” the King’s service and “endangered the dominions of the Crown,” though the reality of the danger is by no means apparent. On the contrary it might be shown that the constant drain upon the French settlements caused by the habitual misgovernment and extortions of their officials made them unable to compete with their enterprising neighbors. The balance of trade was entirely against them. Possessed of the sea power, England could cut off all hope of succor from the French colonies without paralyzing the trade of her own plantations. But the real motive of this measure is to be found, not in the strategical exigencies of the colonial war, but in the desire to preserve inviolate the tradi-

¹ Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade, Plantations General, No. 44.

tional policy of English commerce which demanded that a large percentage of the profits on all the trade of the colonies should be paid as a premium to the mother country.

The history of the growth of this clandestine trade and of the means by which it was successfully prosecuted belongs to a chapter of colonial history which still remains to be written. When Pitt assumed office it had been recognized as a flourishing industry since the year 1746, and was chiefly carried on by collusion between the English, French, Spanish and Dutch settlers on the American continent and the adjacent islands. It was alleged that the Dutch colonies of Curaçao, St. Eustatia and Guiana and the Spanish free ports of Hispaniola served as *emporia* for the clandestine carrying trade of the American colonies and the West Indian islanders with the French settlements. Dutch ships clearing from Holland or Ireland and French ships from Brest or Dunkirk could discharge their cargoes at these convenient centres whence they were distributed by small colonial craft. The American traders it seems were also accustomed to clear out for some Dutch port, but their real destination was a French one where they discharged their cargo of colonial produce and laded again with sugar, rum, cotton or molasses for home under a fictitious clearing for another Dutch port; or if it was cleared for New York, the cargo was reputed to be the produce of an English sugar island and was passed as such by custom-house officials who were bribed to "do the needfull."

It was discovered that many colonial merchants had written contracts to supply the enemy with provisions and warlike stores. Others were supplied with Dutch or French passes to be used as occasion required. These French passports were made out in France and openly sold in Boston. They were addressed to all French commanders and governors and required them to pass the American vessels named therein engaged in supplying the French settlements. If they were boarded by a British cruiser these passes were destroyed, but the bulk of this illicit trade was carried on by small swift sloops or oared cutters which defied pursuit amongst the shoals and creeks of their native coasts.¹

Naturally these ingenious devices for frustrating the monopoly of British trade appeared equally reprehensible to colonial governors and law officers and to the ministers and naval and military commanders of the English crown. "In short, Sir, what tricks do they not play?" is the summary of one worthy official's complaints. It

¹ The above allegations appear in the miscellaneous American papers among the Pringle MSS., *c. g.*, in Bundle 98. A good account is also found in B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, and in Admiralty Jamaica Despatches for 1758—1762.

was even thought that these free-traders "appear much more our enemies than the French themselves."¹ To Halifax and the Board of Trade "the nature of the Trade appeared so destructive, its extent so great and the facts relative to it so alarming" that the whole matter was forthwith referred to the Council.²

Across the course of these dissensions and disasters there came suddenly the calming and invigorating influence of a great statesman. And yet the violence of the evil was such that the effects of the most potent remedies are hardly discernible during two more years of bitter failure and despair.

Perhaps it is in his colonial policy that Chatham's acute and virile statesmanship shows to the best advantage. He was the first English minister who recognized the responsibilities of empire with its possibilities, the first high-almoner of state-craft who cast his bread upon distant waters.

Although he did not assume office until January 1757 there exist proofs that Pitt had followed the troubled history of the American colonies with close attention for some years past.³ The principal phases of that history are illustrated by papers which are still preserved amongst the Chatham manuscripts. We know from a published correspondence that he "dreaded to hear from America"⁴ during the unchecked mismanagement of Newcastle's administration, and when a year later he proclaimed his ability "to save this country" singlehanded he had estimated the effect of a successful colonial war.

From existing reports, intelligences, and from the summaries of official correspondence, all of which are still preserved amongst the unpublished Chatham MSS., we are enabled to follow the course of Chatham's American policy. The development of his plans was slow at first, for it was not possible to undo in a year the effects of three years of disastrous mismanagement following upon a century of general misgovernment.

The colonies must be saved, and they must be saved by their own exertions. "You may depend upon it," writes Jeremiah Gridley, "that a great man said we are to depend for our defense upon our own forces and not upon the regulars."⁵ From first to last this was the guiding principle of Pitt's military strategy and for the present the importance of the colonies was strategical. But in

¹ Pringle MSS.

² Colonial Office Records, Board of Trade Journals, March, 1760.

³ The American papers in the Pringle collection appear to go back to the year 1746. Pitt was made paymaster of the forces in that year.

⁴ *Grenville Correspondence*, June 5, 1756.

⁵ Pringle MSS.

order that these measures of self-defense might prove effective it was necessary that the drooping spirits of the colonists should be raised, that they should be encouraged to play their part with vigor. To accomplish this, as Pitt saw clearly, the colonies must be first conciliated, and indeed conciliation was the keynote of his policy, the panacea which he continued to advocate in a later period of civil troubles.

It would not be an easy matter to define the quality of this conciliation. Perhaps indeed it amounted to little more than a discouragement of the official tone which had been adopted by recent ministries and their agents in dealing with the recalcitrant assemblies. Doubtless the chief factor in the work of conciliation was the selection of a commander-in-chief after the minister's own heart in the person of Amherst, who during the crisis of the war exercised practically the powers of a governor-general, whilst at the same time the powers of the reactionary Board of Plantations were sharply curtailed.¹ Finally Pitt refrained from pressing the enforcement of the recent official crusade against illicit trade except so far as it actually impeded his dispositions for the campaign. Thus one part of the monetary difficulty experienced by his predecessors was avoided, and for the rest the colonists were not slow to recognize that a really successful war was a highly profitable venture. The most dispirited assembly was at length "encouraged by having so grand a plan opened with such prospect of its being carried to effect."²

The plan in question was one which Pitt really deserves the credit of having adopted for he did not himself originate it. A campaign against the French settlements in the nature of a frontier war extending from Virginia to the lake regions was henceforth to be abandoned in favor of a descent upon Canada starting from a given base and carried out both by sea and land. Quebec itself was the real objective of such an expedition and Quebec cut off from succor from France by England's sea-power must sooner or later fall and with it the French dominion on the continent.

"When the spring is diverted or cutt off, the river must dry up. Such is the position of Quebec that it is absolutely the key of French America, and our possession of it would for ever lock out every Frenchman."³

It is interesting to notice that this earlier plan did not contemplate a direct assault on Louisburg, which, until its capitulation should be ensured by the fall of Quebec, was to be rendered harmless by a mere blockade. With this exception the whole course of the future campaign was foreshadowed in a plan which was appar-

¹ Order in Council, June, 1761.

² Pringle MSS.

³ *Ibid.*

ently submitted to Pitt in the year 1756.¹ That this plan was not put in execution at once was entirely owing to circumstances beyond the minister's control. His instructions to Loudoun and Abercrombie display just as much energy and foresight as are evident in his direction of the successful campaigns between 1758 and 1761. The different results are due partly to the want of a free hand in the choice of instruments to carry out his plans, which as he afterwards complained were systematically thwarted by his colleagues in the Council, and partly to the lack of colonial interest in the war. The colonies had not yet been conciliated.

The turning-point in the fortunes of the war with France in America was reached in March, 1758, the date of Pitt's instructions to Amherst commanding the expedition against Louisburg for "the diligent prosecution of this great enterprize."

After the fall of Louisburg the issue of the war was never in doubt, but new difficulties arose as its area became enlarged and when its strictly colonial character dropped out of sight. The success of Pitt's colonial policy was written upon the walls of Quebec and Montreal before the impending danger of the Family Compact caused him to attempt its expansion upon imperial lines. As a counter-blow to the threatened Bourbon alliance France must be attacked in Louisiana and Martinique. She must be driven out of America and the West Indies, just as she must be humbled by descents upon her sea-board. Thus she would be reduced to conclude a peace before she could gain time to recover her ground by a new alliance with a maritime and colonial power. It was with this great object in view that, in the spring of 1761, Pitt issued a circular to the governors of the American colonies directing them to appeal to the assemblies for a grant of fresh levies for colonial defences to enable the government "not only to secure the Conquests already made, but also to push on the war with the utmost vigour until the French are totally removed from this continent."²

In the dangerous state of the colonial temper Pitt had worked wonders by his crusade of three years past. Even now his influence, exercised through his chosen agent Amherst, prevailed over personal interests and local selfishness. At the first asking the canny New Englanders demurred to this unusual proposal. Their forefathers had not haggled in vain over subsidies, nor protested in vain against forced loans, shipmoney, billeting and martial law under impecunious

¹ Pringle MSS.

² This and the following references to the colonial correspondence of the period have been chiefly taken from the series of "Governor's Letters" (America and West Indies) in the Colonial Office Records.

personal monarchs. They wished for further information as to the objective of these armaments. Moreover, as of old redress of grievances must precede supply. The Pennsylvanians who had a bitter feud with their "Proprietors" refused point-blank to pass any appropriation until certain acts of the assembly had been allowed. Other colonies voted less than two-thirds of the levies granted for the campaign of Quebec, and then with strict limitations as to length of service. Billet-money and conduct-money had been docked by the red-tape of the British Treasury for arms not returned into store, and this system must be disavowed. Even then these provincial levies must be employed for local defences only. Where there was no danger of French invasion they must be used as frontier police against the Cherokees or other savage neighbors. A winter campaign was out of the question and the troops must be disbanded in November or earlier if peace should not be concluded before that date. The governors were in despair. One "had no hope of obtaining more." Another's fears "this is all he can bring them to." A third objects that "in the present state of the Province . . . he should meet with unsurmountable difficulties." But the Secretary of State was unmoved. He betrayed neither surprise nor indignation at this answer to his appeal. These sturdy colonists were his spoilt children, and he knew how to bear with their wayward moods. The governors were told to "try them again;" to beg one that was so noted for its public spirit not to "furnish a precedent for the others to refuse;" to "give satisfaction to the Assemblies;" whereupon Mr. Secretary "hopes soon to be informed" of their resolves "to be entirely conformable to His Majesty's expectation." The result was so far satisfactory that men and money were voted for the purpose in hand. Even Amherst's expectations were at length satisfied, and the veterans of Canada could be led against Dominique, Guadeloupe and Belleisle.

It has been said that Pitt before he resigned the seals in October of this year had planned the capture both of Havana and Manila. But even if this persistent assertion were true, which it can be shown from contemporary state papers was not the case, Pitt was no longer at hand to superintend his own strategy. The whole plan of the campaign of the year 1762 depended upon the co-operation of the American colonies, and this could not be forced either by promises or by threats. It was useless for the new Secretary to require the despondent governors to represent to the assemblies "the necessity of their complying with the king's demands," which were even higher than before. It was childish to assure them that they "would rejoyce hereafter when they found that their compliance

with the king's commands met with his Majesty's approbation." It was dangerous to threaten that their refusal would "exclude them from any title to His Majesty's particular favour."

The result was disastrous in the extreme. Some assemblies "broke up without having in any respect whatever complied with His Majesty's requisitions." Others treated the royal message in a "disrespectful manner." Inadequate votes were passed and still worse amidst a total absence of enthusiasm for the war. And so though Martinique fell and then Havana, these and other conquests could not be held with the force available. When Amherst had been pressed for reinforcements he had replied that he dared not part with another man if America itself was to be safely held.

This may well be the secret of those concessions which made the Treaty of Paris seem so disadvantageous to this country. If the whole of these vast conquests were to be retained, there must either have been a great increase in the regular establishment or sweeping concessions to the colonies in the direction of self-government and commercial privileges. As it was, George the Third and Lord Bute had no intention of spending money upon military establishments or subventions, neither were they willing to forego the revenues which the Crown received directly or indirectly from the colonies. The only course open was to abandon the bulk of the conquests of 1761 and 1762.

But unhappily the matter did not end here. The colonies were indirectly responsible for the odium which attached to the authors of the treaty, and they must be brought to book once for all. Then the spiteful and futile attempts to impose what was practically a war fine upon those high-spirited and semi-independent communities completed the ruin of the great schemes which Pitt had conceived for restoring the balance of the European power in a new world.

That Pitt himself would have carried out these schemes on a still larger scale and with an even more successful result we can scarcely doubt. We cannot doubt at all that he would have refused to cede an inch of territory within the sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Atlantic. That he would have triumphed over all difficulties with the colonies we may well believe, though this might have involved a scheme of imperial federation, a scheme which might have altered the whole course of our history, which might in fact have detached England from Continental politics, which might have led to the consolidation of an unbroken sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence in the North Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

It may fairly be asked how far we are in a position to venture upon this forecast of Pitt's colonial policy, which must necessarily

have undergone some important modifications at the conclusion of an European peace. To this we may reply that the statesman's later speeches in defence of the constitutional liberties of the colonies prove that he regarded them as something more than the weapons of his vengeance against a perfidious enemy.

There is evidence once more amongst the Chatham papers that long before the conclusion of the great war the problem of the future government of the colonies had engaged his attention. The danger had been clearly foreseen by more than one of his advisers of "the projects of independency which a consciousness of growing strength and the annihilation of the French power might give birth to in our American Colonies." To this it was replied that "an upright and steady government will always have due weight with the bulk of the people," whilst it might be possible to retain their goodwill by important constitutional changes. Canada might be erected into a kingdom for Prince Edward, and if necessary another sovereignty might be created in the colonies themselves. Such a confederation of crowns would be more effective, because more natural, than the family compact of the Bourbons, since here would be found "the union of two peoples of the same blood, religion, polity, language, laws, honour and genius under the same family."¹

It would be but a vain speculation to suggest that any such scheme as this would have seriously engaged Pitt's attention if he had remained in power for some ten years longer. But even after an absence of five years from the helm of the state, and in spite of the conclusion of a peace which had thwarted his deep-laid plans, these dreams of colonial federation might still have been realized under a ministry in which Chatham kept the direction of American affairs in his own hands. It would seem indeed that such a plan was in his thoughts during the ministerial crisis of the spring of 1766, for there exists amongst his papers a draft in his own hand of an ideal ministry in which as a new Secretary of State for the "American Department" there appears the name of "Mr. Pitt." In such a congenial position we cannot doubt that he would have devoted himself to devise some remedial measures which might have removed the worst features of colonial misgovernment.

The standing army necessary for the protection of the colonies would have been under the strictest discipline and control and the regiments would have been changed every two or three years. The inquisitorial aspect of the Navigation Laws in connection with illicit trade would have been no longer apparent with the destruction of

¹ Pringle MSS. This remarkable paper is undated, but appears to have been received by Pitt in 1756.

the French power in the New World. Finally the colonial assemblies would have enjoyed the fullest rights of legislation and taxation for all purposes of local government. Even when the colonies had been goaded to armed resistance by ten years of perverse misgovernment, Chatham's just and humane scheme of constitutional reform might have saved the situation and might have paved the way for an inevitable and honorable concession of independence which would have left no lasting traces of bitterness or resentment.

The scheme in question may be regarded as the epitome of Chatham's strenuous advocacy of the cause of colonial liberty from 1765 to the day on which he yielded up his breath with the name of his well-loved children upon his lips. It is embodied in the "Provisional Act for Settling the Troubles in America," introduced by Chatham in the House of Lords on February 1, 1775. The provisions of this famous measure need not be recited here. The clearest description of the scope and intention of this "true reconciliation" between England and her colonies may be found in the sneering summary by one of its opponents, "it fell in with the ideas of America in almost every particular." It contained indeed the fullest expression of Pitt's earliest conception, "you must repeal her fears and her resentments, and you may then hope for her love and gratitude."

How near this measure lay to the great statesman's heart may be judged from an examination of the passage which is shown in the plate, a facsimile of a page of the original draft in Chatham's own hand, from which the painful care bestowed upon the drafting of this bill is apparent. The wording of the passage as drafted is as follows and differs, as will be seen, from the final version:

"Always understood that the free grant of a supply¹ from the Colonies is not considered as a Condition of Redress, but as a Testimony of their Affection."

In this one sentence is revealed the spirit of Chatham's colonial policy, and the same sentiment of justice and moderation pervades the whole of a measure which its author prophesied would "make its way to the public, to the nation, to the remotest wilds of America," and would remain a monument of his endeavors to save his country.

The bill rejected by the House of Lords in 1775 is indeed a monument of this kind, but it did not mark the close of Chatham's efforts on behalf of "our brethren and countrymen in America, of the same language, laws, liberties and religion; endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity." These words were spoken in 1777 and during the session of this year his voice was several

¹ "Contribution" and "aid" successively rejected.

and for the free grant of
the aid ~~required by you and~~
~~asked~~ ~~be always~~ ~~under~~
~~stood~~ ~~that it is expected not~~
as a condition of Redress but
as a fruit of Affection.

The free grant of the aid
previously before
before required. being understood,

n
always understood that the
free grant ~~is not to be~~ ~~from the Colours~~
~~is not to be~~ ~~not expected~~
~~is not to be~~ ~~as a condition~~
of Redress but is the fruit of
Affection.

times raised in passionate protest against a policy of force. "We have invaded them as much as the Spanish Armada invaded England."

On May 30 of this year before a crowded House, its approaches blocked by peers and commoners, officials and spectators roused from the apathy of sullen despair by the magic of his name, Chatham pleaded once more the cause of the nation whom he loved.

"I remember," there rang out in one of his happiest sentences, "when they raised four regiments on their own bottom and took Louisburg from the veteran troops of France." He was thinking of the days when as Paymaster of the Forces he first took an interest in colonial politics. Then follows quickly the closing scene in which, protesting in the interests (as these might well have been) of England and her colonies alike against the dismemberment of a great empire, he adjured the country to choose between their enemies and friends and not to "fall prostrate before the House of Bourbon"—the statesman's ruling instinct strongest in his death.

And so the world has passed. The country of Chatham's birth has long ago forgotten the place-names given in his honor, but the great nation which he called into being has not forgotten that Fort Pitt was planted on the ruins of Fort Duquesne. There are some memories which will always be hallowed in connection with the meanest and saddest episodes in a nation's history, and amongst these the memory of Chatham's brave and honest friendship with the Americans of his day will not be easily forgotten by their grandchildren's children.

HUBERT HALL.